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AbstractRecent decades have seen a surge in women occupying positions of political power. This has been welcomed in part as a means of achieving better policy outcomes for women. We interrogate this proposition, developing a "gendered accountability" framework to explain when and how female representation promotes the implementation of policies that women prioritize. Our empirical analysis applies this framework to sub-Saharan Africa, home to the largest recent expansion in women's political representation. We find that increased female representation in the legislature is robustly associated with reduced infant and child mortality as well as greater spending on health. Effects are magnified when women are more active in civil society and appear primarily in countries that have gender quotas and proportional electoral systems. Thus, while female representation can lead to improved policy outcomes for women, the process is not automatic and is unlikely to occur absent key institutional and societal conditions.

A large body of literature investigates whether increasing the number of women in legislative office translates into policies that benefit women in society. This research builds upon theories about descriptive and substantive representation. However, these theories may not travel well to authoritarian contexts, where we see some of the largest gains in women legislators in recent years. This article unpacks the link between women's descriptive representation, healthcare spending, and health outcomes by regime type. Using a sample of 169 countries from 2000 to 2018, we find that the percentage of women legislators is associated with increased healthcare spending across all regimes. However, women's health outcomes do not improve with women's descriptive representation in closed autocracies. Meanwhile, the results for democracies and electoral autocracies are similar, suggesting that even limited vertical accountability through semi-competitive elections may facilitate substantive representation of women.

AbstractAs women's political inclusion has become the international norm, many countries have implemented gender quotas or actively tried to increase women's political representation. Women's inclusion is also expected to bring positive development outcomes, as women, both as voters and politicians, may prioritize policies conducive to development. Yet, previous research has shown that descriptive representation does not automatically improve governance, and that various contextual factors influence (female) politicians' ability to shape policy outcomes. In this article, we examine how political corruption affects the dynamics of women's representation. We argue that while the presence of women in politics has the potential to increase development, it can also be used as "window‐dressing" to legitimize rule where in reality male patrons continue to dominate policy decisions. Thus, women representatives recruited from the same corrupt networks as these male patrons may be used to perpetuate the status‐quo or even decrease development outcomes. Building on previous research, we argue that patriarchal gender norms and relatively weaker standing of women in corrupt environments can explain why women in these societies may support policy decisions that go against their preferences and interests as a group. We conduct a quantitative analysis drawing on time‐series cross‐sectional data on 182 countries from 1900 to 2014 to shed light on the linkage between women empowerment, corruption, and development. We find that women's representation only promotes human development if corruption is at low levels, while under high level of corruption women's inclusion is associated with worsened development outcomes. This finding suggests that women political empowerment might not always be a silver bullet to increasing substantive representation, and especially not under very poor levels of governance and prevalent corruption.

Accountability—constraints on a government's use of political power—is one of the cornerstones of good governance. However, conceptual stretching and a lack of reliable measures have limited cross-national research on this concept. To address this research gap, we use V-Dem data and innovative Bayesian methods to develop new indices of accountability and its subtypes: the extent to which governments are accountable to citizens (vertical accountability), other state institutions (horizontal accountability), and the media and civil society (diagonal accountability). In this article, we describe the conceptual and empirical framework underlying these indices and demonstrate their content, convergent, and construct validity. The resulting indices have unprecedented coverage (1900–present) and offer researchers and policymakers new opportunities to investigate the causes and consequences of accountability and its disaggregated subtypes. Furthermore, the methodology provides a framework for theoretically driven index construction to scholars working with cross-national panel data.

This study tests the relationship between democracy and population health. Some studies argue that democracies are more likely than authoritarian regimes to provide public goods and, thus, enhance health. However, recent research has challenged this argument and identified good governance as the crucial determinant of human development. Using a newly collected dataset covering 173 countries from 1900 to 2012, our analyses show that across models with various specifications, democratic elections have consistent effects on health outcomes even when other important factors, including good governance, are taken into account. There are some nuances in this relationship. First, the impact of electoral democracy tends to persist over time. Furthermore, the positive effects are particularly salient once the quality of elections has achieved a certain threshold. Our results also suggest that previous studies yielded mixed results in part because the commonly used governance indicators are only available for relatively short time periods, and the sample does not reflect the entire range of variation in measures of both democracy and governance.